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The English title of the text gave me initial concern because I recently contributed to The 
Edinburgh Companion to Critical Theory, ed. Stuart Sim, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University 
Press, 2016, an essay entitled ‘Phenomenology and Poststructuralism’ (pp. 91-108) in which I 
argued that the inspiration for Pierre Bourdieu’s post-structuralist social science lay in his 
absorption of the legacy of Husserl’s phenomenology.  My concern increased when I found 
that Angermuller’s analysis is heavily dependent on Bourdieu’s conceptual framework.  
Indeed, the book consists of five chapters, the first four of which were originally published in 
French (in 2013) as Le champ de la Théorie:  Essor et déclin du structuralisme en France 
[the field of Theory: rise and fall of structuralism in France], explicitly acknowledging, in 
other words, the application of Bourdieu’s ‘field’ theory to consideration of Theory. 
The first problem that I have with this book, therefore, is that it deploys those concepts and 
methodology developed by Bourdieu in France between 1960 and his death in 2002 which I 
regard as ‘post-structuralist’ to argue, in the English title, that poststructuralism does not exist 
in France.  In my view, Bourdieu’s post-structuralist position developed in his practice 
between 1960 and 1980.  In his early fieldwork in Algeria at the end of the 1950s, Bourdieu 
was sensitive to the danger that he might superimpose colonial attitudes and values on the 
behaviour of the indigenous Algerians whom he interviewed and interpreted.  His intention 
was to use phenomenological assumptions to disclose the ‘sinnhafte Aufbau’, the meaningful 
constructivism of social agents (to use Schutz’s phrase adopted in the title of his 1932 
critique of Weber’s ‘verstehende Soziologie’[interpretive sociology]) without contaminating 
these meanings through the a priori imposition of explanations generated in a different 
(Western) socio-political context.  This determination led Bourdieu to formulate a model 
which distinguished between the self-understanding of their situations developed by social 
agents on the basis of their primary experience and the ‘objective’ analyses of those same 
situations produced by observers/social scientists.  The first understanding is derived from the 
dispositions which people inherit from their family upbringing (their ‘habitus’), and the 
second understanding is articulated within the logically distinct discourses of competing 
‘sciences’.  Bourdieu outlined this position in the mid-1970s between the writing of his 
Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique [sketch of a theory of practice] (1972) and the 
publication of its translation into English as Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977) when he 
also began to make it clear that the theorising of the second kind of understanding has no 
privileged status in relation to the first but, instead, is only a linguistically extended version 
of the first.  Hence he emphasized that sociology should be systematically ‘reflexive’, by 
which he meant that all analyses of discourses (‘structured structures’ or ‘intellectual fields’) 
can only be saved from a self-referentiality designed to protect social distinction if they are 
themselves subjected to a meta-sociological analysis which indicates the social and socio-
historical origins of their production (analysis of their ‘structuring structures’).  It is important 
to note that Bourdieu wanted to advance a theory of practice, one which would help to clarify 
both the practical actions of ordinary people and the theoretical stances adopted by scientists 
as their forms of practice.  He was always hostile to disembodied Theory which he called 
‘theoretical’ or ‘theoreticist’ theory. 
 
Angermuller’s endeavour is, therefore, highly paradoxical or ambivalent.  There are good 
chapters on the social conditions of production of poststructuralism in France, particularly 
chapter 3 which gives an important account of the ‘boom of the human sciences in the 1960s 
and 1970s’, ‘the formation of the structuralist generation’, and ‘the neoliberal turn of the 
1980s’.  These detail some of the ‘structuring structures’ of ‘Theory’ in France in the period 
after World War II.  However, Angermuller’s opening chapter formulates the problem which 
he is addressing in a way which suggests that he acquiesces in consideration of Theory as a 
‘structured structure’ without reference to the account of the conditions of its social 
production which he offers.  He is aware of the difficulty that ‘Theory’ or ‘poststructuralism’ 
were not identified as such by the people who have been thought to be their main 
protagonists.  Angermuller says, for instance, of Foucault: “What a tragedy: a leader of a 
movement who knows nothing of his movement!” (p. 2).  The ‘Theory’ about which his 
passion was first aroused by a seminar at Duke University in 1995 (Preface, p. vii) is, by his 
own admission, a ‘field’ which has been constituted by the North American reception of 
French thought more than by the social conditions of the French intellectual ‘field’ within 
which it was produced.  He even, rightly, asks the question:  “Is the talk of ‘French 
poststructuralism’ perhaps the product of a huge international misunderstanding?” (p. 2).  It 
is. The crucial question then is how we react to this recognition. In chapter 4, Angermuller 
convincingly analyses the conditions in the United States which generated a distorted 
understanding of French thought.  However, he seems happy to accept misrepresentation as a 
phenomenon to be studied.  To put this in terms of other descriptive labels, he seems happy to 
borrow from Bourdieu a modernist methodology to analyse a postmodern phenomenon and, 
by legitimating ‘Theory’ as a product he contrives to condone the detachment from practice 
which Bourdieu was intent on criticising.  Highly relevant here is the critique which Bourdieu 
offered of misrepresentations of his work in his concluding remarks entitled “For a 
Sociogenetic Understanding of Intellectual Works” in Bourdieu.  Critical Perspectives, ed. 
Calhoun, LiPuma, and Postone, 1993, Oxford, Polity Press. 
In an interesting and important final chapter, Angermuller treats the rise of unreflexive 
Theory as an irreversible aspect of contemporary life. He even suggests that such spurious 
Theory might offer a paradigm for the development of a ‘post-classical social theory’ which 
‘aims at deconstructing societal representations of social order’ (p. 101).  I agree with 
Angermuller that we have increasingly to find ways of understanding international relations 
in terms of inter-cultural personal relations rather than in terms of the ‘structured structure’ 
discourse of nation-state identity, but this does not mean that we should renounce authentic 
adherence to our different primary experiences in favour of fake theory peddled in an 
international intellectual field dominated by American conceptual imperialism. 
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